1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:05,179 Oh 2 00:00:09,810 --> 00:00:07,140 good morning and welcome to today's 3 00:00:11,490 --> 00:00:09,820 mission status briefing with us today is 4 00:00:13,560 --> 00:00:11,500 quite see Oliver ooh hold the lead 5 00:00:16,500 --> 00:00:13,570 shuttle flight director just coming off 6 00:00:19,500 --> 00:00:16,510 its orbit one shift what's it thank you 7 00:00:21,630 --> 00:00:19,510 well good morning the sts-135 mission 8 00:00:25,020 --> 00:00:21,640 continues to go and absolutely 9 00:00:27,120 --> 00:00:25,030 outstanding fashion our crew is you're 10 00:00:30,900 --> 00:00:27,130 used to hearing now is continuing to 11 00:00:33,229 --> 00:00:30,910 perform incredibly we are running right 12 00:00:35,940 --> 00:00:33,239 about on the timeline with respect to 13 00:00:38,310 --> 00:00:35,950 transfer operations of cargo from the 14 00:00:40,770 --> 00:00:38,320 shuttle mid deck and the MP LM as well 15 00:00:42,150 --> 00:00:40,780 as the transfer return the crew 16 00:00:44,010 --> 00:00:42,160 generally of course has been very 17 00:00:45,810 --> 00:00:44,020 efficient however we've experienced a 18 00:00:47,880 --> 00:00:45,820 couple of minor problems or little 19 00:00:51,510 --> 00:00:47,890 hiccups on along the way which will tell 20 00:00:53,069 --> 00:00:51,520 you about that have used up a little bit 21 00:00:56,190 --> 00:00:53,079 of time but because of their overall 22 00:00:58,020 --> 00:00:56,200 efficiency in their organization and how 23 00:00:59,940 --> 00:00:58,030 well the transfer has been going it's 24 00:01:03,209 --> 00:00:59,950 not going to impact the the mission to 25 00:01:06,480 --> 00:01:03,219 any significant degree right now we are 26 00:01:08,699 --> 00:01:06,490 about seventy percent complete with all 27 00:01:11,010 --> 00:01:08,709 of the transfer that the crew was 28 00:01:12,899 --> 00:01:11,020 timeline to accomplish during this 29 00:01:15,510 --> 00:01:12,909 mission and that's just seventy percent 30 00:01:17,099 --> 00:01:15,520 with respect to the number of items that 31 00:01:18,809 --> 00:01:17,109 they'll lay their hands on that that 32 00:01:20,399 --> 00:01:18,819 doesn't correlate necessarily to the 33 00:01:23,129 --> 00:01:20,409 amount of volume that's been transferred 34 00:01:25,709 --> 00:01:23,139 or the amount of mass but we think that 35 00:01:28,289 --> 00:01:25,719 we think that will be will be at about 36 00:01:29,879 --> 00:01:28,299 seventy percent of the total mass that 37 00:01:32,999 --> 00:01:29,889 we're going to transfer some time 38 00:01:36,120 --> 00:01:33,009 tomorrow in the afternoon today the crew 39 00:01:39,539 --> 00:01:36,130 has got some off-duty time which is very 40 00:01:41,550 --> 00:01:39,549 well-deserved just so they can as not so 41 00:01:43,739 --> 00:01:41,560 much unwind as it were but just throttle 42 00:01:46,440 --> 00:01:43,749 back a bit because they've been working 43 00:01:48,659 --> 00:01:46,450 really hard and of course this off-duty 44 00:01:51,029 --> 00:01:48,669 time is prescribed by our shuttle crew 45 00:01:53,309 --> 00:01:51,039 scheduling constraints in order to 46 00:01:55,859 --> 00:01:53,319 maintain overall fitness and health of 47 00:01:58,469 --> 00:01:55,869 the crew as we proceed with the mission 48 00:02:00,120 --> 00:01:58,479 now many of you have heard by now last 49 00:02:02,489 --> 00:02:00,130 night in the middle of the crews sleep 50 00:02:04,769 --> 00:02:02,499 we had a problem with general purpose 51 00:02:07,469 --> 00:02:04,779 computer number four that's GPC number 52 00:02:09,719 --> 00:02:07,479 four on the shuttle that GPC was 53 00:02:12,900 --> 00:02:09,729 configured as our systems management 54 00:02:15,090 --> 00:02:12,910 machine or sm machine as as we like to 55 00:02:16,020 --> 00:02:15,100 say for short you know how fond we are 56 00:02:18,059 --> 00:02:16,030 of our acronyms 57 00:02:20,730 --> 00:02:18,069 but basically the SM machine what it 58 00:02:23,790 --> 00:02:20,740 does force is some environmental control 59 00:02:26,250 --> 00:02:23,800 it also controls the antennas for our 60 00:02:29,250 --> 00:02:26,260 communication system as well as does 61 00:02:31,710 --> 00:02:29,260 some general fault detection and an 62 00:02:35,059 --> 00:02:31,720 enunciation for the orbiters core 63 00:02:37,800 --> 00:02:35,069 spacecraft systems that computer 64 00:02:40,800 --> 00:02:37,810 returned an error code it basically 65 00:02:42,360 --> 00:02:40,810 failed and in a matter that we call a 66 00:02:46,670 --> 00:02:42,370 fail to quit which essentially means 67 00:02:49,050 --> 00:02:46,680 that it it just stopped and so the 68 00:02:51,750 --> 00:02:49,060 master alarm that was that was 69 00:02:53,670 --> 00:02:51,760 enunciated when that happened right 70 00:02:55,949 --> 00:02:53,680 around two ish hours into the crew sleep 71 00:02:58,890 --> 00:02:55,959 that woke the crew up and they spent 72 00:03:01,680 --> 00:02:58,900 about 30 minutes reconfiguring the 73 00:03:03,660 --> 00:03:01,690 computers to move the systems management 74 00:03:07,740 --> 00:03:03,670 functions to general purpose computer 75 00:03:11,040 --> 00:03:07,750 number to GPC to we then shut off GPC 76 00:03:13,350 --> 00:03:11,050 number 4 and replan today is planned to 77 00:03:15,090 --> 00:03:13,360 to do some detailed troubleshooting on 78 00:03:17,370 --> 00:03:15,100 it we allowed the crew to sleep in about 79 00:03:18,690 --> 00:03:17,380 30 minutes later since we did take about 80 00:03:21,150 --> 00:03:18,700 30 minutes away from their sleep and 81 00:03:22,620 --> 00:03:21,160 they did take us up on that and so once 82 00:03:25,319 --> 00:03:22,630 the crew got going with their day today 83 00:03:28,650 --> 00:03:25,329 commander Chris Ferguson and pilot Doug 84 00:03:31,259 --> 00:03:28,660 Hurley took about 45 minutes to run this 85 00:03:35,190 --> 00:03:31,269 troubleshooting procedure on GPC for to 86 00:03:38,759 --> 00:03:35,200 basically bring it up to do a data dump 87 00:03:42,150 --> 00:03:38,769 of the memory from GPC number one which 88 00:03:45,599 --> 00:03:42,160 was the active primary GNC computer that 89 00:03:48,319 --> 00:03:45,609 saw GP c 4 status when it failed so we 90 00:03:51,479 --> 00:03:48,329 dump that computer's memory we then 91 00:03:53,849 --> 00:03:51,489 initialize GPC for and dumped its memory 92 00:03:56,640 --> 00:03:53,859 to to see what it thought about why it 93 00:03:58,590 --> 00:03:56,650 failed and and then we did an initial 94 00:04:00,810 --> 00:03:58,600 program load essentially ran the exact 95 00:04:04,140 --> 00:04:00,820 same procedure that we ran a few days 96 00:04:08,250 --> 00:04:04,150 ago in response to the the switch T's 97 00:04:11,099 --> 00:04:08,260 failure on GPC 3gp c4 actually did 98 00:04:12,720 --> 00:04:11,109 behave itself it did recover the dumps 99 00:04:14,400 --> 00:04:12,730 were completed nominally and our 100 00:04:16,380 --> 00:04:14,410 engineering teams are analyzing that 101 00:04:19,500 --> 00:04:16,390 dump data right now it will take about 102 00:04:21,270 --> 00:04:19,510 another several hours to get the results 103 00:04:23,100 --> 00:04:21,280 of that dump data we expect a full 104 00:04:25,500 --> 00:04:23,110 report from the engineering teams when 105 00:04:27,600 --> 00:04:25,510 my my flight control team comes on shift 106 00:04:28,410 --> 00:04:27,610 tomorrow or actually really later 107 00:04:31,470 --> 00:04:28,420 tonight 108 00:04:33,450 --> 00:04:31,480 and right now there's no smoking guns 109 00:04:36,450 --> 00:04:33,460 that they've identified as to the cause 110 00:04:38,580 --> 00:04:36,460 of the failure in such a case we treated 111 00:04:40,680 --> 00:04:38,590 is really a transient hardware failure 112 00:04:43,320 --> 00:04:40,690 that might be stimulated by any number 113 00:04:44,760 --> 00:04:43,330 of things you know radiation is one 114 00:04:47,430 --> 00:04:44,770 possible cause but we don't have any 115 00:04:49,890 --> 00:04:47,440 conclusive evidence of that although the 116 00:04:51,270 --> 00:04:49,900 orbiter was as flying through the South 117 00:04:52,710 --> 00:04:51,280 Atlantic anomaly at the time of the 118 00:04:55,410 --> 00:04:52,720 failure so that's just one of the many 119 00:04:57,720 --> 00:04:55,420 things that we think about so once we 120 00:05:00,060 --> 00:04:57,730 brought that computer up we basically 121 00:05:03,780 --> 00:05:00,070 put it to sleep just like we did the GPC 122 00:05:07,710 --> 00:05:03,790 3 and so we're now in a nominal config 123 00:05:10,620 --> 00:05:07,720 again with GP c 1 as our GNC computer 124 00:05:13,130 --> 00:05:10,630 and GPC to which is slightly different 125 00:05:14,670 --> 00:05:13,140 as our systems management computer and 126 00:05:16,620 --> 00:05:14,680 we're going to stay in this 127 00:05:18,720 --> 00:05:16,630 configuration probably for another 128 00:05:22,020 --> 00:05:18,730 couple of shifts another several hours 129 00:05:25,470 --> 00:05:22,030 and think about getting some run time on 130 00:05:26,940 --> 00:05:25,480 GPC for before we undock just to observe 131 00:05:28,950 --> 00:05:26,950 its performance and see if there's any 132 00:05:30,870 --> 00:05:28,960 anything additional that we want to do 133 00:05:34,470 --> 00:05:30,880 with it now once we review the results 134 00:05:36,120 --> 00:05:34,480 of the data dumps and the the memory 135 00:05:37,950 --> 00:05:36,130 analysis that the engineering teams are 136 00:05:40,290 --> 00:05:37,960 doing that still may reveal something 137 00:05:43,170 --> 00:05:40,300 that that leads us to investigate some 138 00:05:44,280 --> 00:05:43,180 some other possible root causes and to 139 00:05:46,200 --> 00:05:44,290 think about some other things that we 140 00:05:48,360 --> 00:05:46,210 might want to do with the computer but 141 00:05:50,370 --> 00:05:48,370 for the time being we've got we've got 142 00:05:52,080 --> 00:05:50,380 it recovered and we think it will 143 00:05:53,840 --> 00:05:52,090 probably continue to function well for 144 00:05:57,480 --> 00:05:53,850 us for the duration of the mission the 145 00:06:01,260 --> 00:05:57,490 other little anomaly that you might hear 146 00:06:03,450 --> 00:06:01,270 about shortly is a broken latch on a 147 00:06:05,610 --> 00:06:03,460 locker door where we store our lithium 148 00:06:08,490 --> 00:06:05,620 hydroxide canisters these canisters are 149 00:06:10,890 --> 00:06:08,500 our co2 scrubbers on the orbiter we 150 00:06:13,050 --> 00:06:10,900 don't need them right now for the co2 151 00:06:15,690 --> 00:06:13,060 control on the shuttle because the 152 00:06:17,580 --> 00:06:15,700 regenerative co2 removal systems on the 153 00:06:18,720 --> 00:06:17,590 International Space Station are 154 00:06:21,660 --> 00:06:18,730 providing more than sufficient 155 00:06:24,390 --> 00:06:21,670 capability to control co2 but we were 156 00:06:27,390 --> 00:06:24,400 scheduled to get into that that liyo 157 00:06:29,490 --> 00:06:27,400 locker if you will to to change out some 158 00:06:31,380 --> 00:06:29,500 of the canisters that are on the space 159 00:06:33,600 --> 00:06:31,390 station older canisters with the fresh 160 00:06:35,610 --> 00:06:33,610 canisters that we flew up on on Atlantis 161 00:06:37,110 --> 00:06:35,620 that's the standard procedure that we 162 00:06:38,220 --> 00:06:37,120 typically do during these missions in 163 00:06:40,110 --> 00:06:38,230 order to make sure that the 164 00:06:41,679 --> 00:06:40,120 International Space Station has the the 165 00:06:44,859 --> 00:06:41,689 freshest canisters that 166 00:06:47,739 --> 00:06:44,869 that are possible and and so we will 167 00:06:49,179 --> 00:06:47,749 have to probably do some kind of some 168 00:06:50,799 --> 00:06:49,189 kind of maintenance activity on that 169 00:06:53,139 --> 00:06:50,809 locker to get it get it open at a 170 00:06:55,749 --> 00:06:53,149 convenient time might get to do that 171 00:06:58,539 --> 00:06:55,759 sometime today maybe sometime tomorrow 172 00:06:59,679 --> 00:06:58,549 but other than those things again 173 00:07:02,529 --> 00:06:59,689 Atlantis continues to perform 174 00:07:04,209 --> 00:07:02,539 beautifully the transformation is going 175 00:07:06,609 --> 00:07:04,219 very well we haven't experienced any 176 00:07:07,899 --> 00:07:06,619 other significant problems with the 177 00:07:10,539 --> 00:07:07,909 spacecraft and of course we're going to 178 00:07:11,499 --> 00:07:10,549 continue to watch the computers and and 179 00:07:14,019 --> 00:07:11,509 make sure that they behave themselves 180 00:07:16,929 --> 00:07:14,029 but right now we think we are very much 181 00:07:19,239 --> 00:07:16,939 on a path where we will likely be able 182 00:07:23,979 --> 00:07:19,249 to configure the computers nominally for 183 00:07:25,959 --> 00:07:23,989 entry and landing on on flight day 13 so 184 00:07:29,019 --> 00:07:25,969 that's the status that we've got right 185 00:07:33,850 --> 00:07:29,029 now tomorrow we have on the plate more 186 00:07:36,219 --> 00:07:33,860 transfer so again repetition of pretty 187 00:07:39,339 --> 00:07:36,229 much the same theme with very little 188 00:07:41,499 --> 00:07:39,349 variation cargo transfer cargo transfer 189 00:07:44,049 --> 00:07:41,509 and more cargo transfer but again that's 190 00:07:45,729 --> 00:07:44,059 the reason that this the spacecraft is 191 00:07:48,579 --> 00:07:45,739 docked and that part of the mission is 192 00:07:51,429 --> 00:07:48,589 going very very well this point I'll 193 00:07:52,989 --> 00:07:51,439 turn back to you Thank You Kwazii we'll 194 00:07:54,909 --> 00:07:52,999 take questions now starting here at 195 00:07:56,709 --> 00:07:54,919 Johnson Space Center please remember to 196 00:07:59,290 --> 00:07:56,719 step to the mic to ask a question and 197 00:08:03,489 --> 00:07:59,300 please remember to identify yourself by 198 00:08:06,629 --> 00:08:03,499 name and affiliation thanks son all 199 00:08:09,179 --> 00:08:06,639 right so Marco for aviation week and 200 00:08:12,309 --> 00:08:09,189 could you go over with the nominal 201 00:08:16,359 --> 00:08:12,319 configuration for the g pcs would would 202 00:08:18,489 --> 00:08:16,369 be for landing and also it doesn't look 203 00:08:21,669 --> 00:08:18,499 like there's any common thread between 204 00:08:24,729 --> 00:08:21,679 three and four at this point but just to 205 00:08:27,729 --> 00:08:24,739 be sure do you consider three available 206 00:08:29,439 --> 00:08:27,739 for anything you need it to do ok for 207 00:08:32,019 --> 00:08:29,449 the rest of the mission at landing great 208 00:08:34,299 --> 00:08:32,029 questions first off let me ask let me 209 00:08:36,459 --> 00:08:34,309 answer the shorter the shorter shorter 210 00:08:38,829 --> 00:08:36,469 question answer and that is about GPC 211 00:08:41,290 --> 00:08:38,839 three right now we consider GPC three a 212 00:08:43,329 --> 00:08:41,300 perfectly healthy and functional GPC 213 00:08:46,030 --> 00:08:43,339 that is available for use for whatever 214 00:08:47,980 --> 00:08:46,040 we might need to use it for typically we 215 00:08:49,870 --> 00:08:47,990 will use it as a 216 00:08:52,269 --> 00:08:49,880 a guidance navigation control computer 217 00:08:54,400 --> 00:08:52,279 and we don't see any liens against doing 218 00:08:57,570 --> 00:08:54,410 that at this time now the nominal 219 00:09:01,300 --> 00:08:57,580 configuration of the the GPC s4 entry 220 00:09:04,900 --> 00:09:01,310 essentially we will not only have all 5g 221 00:09:06,639 --> 00:09:04,910 pcs up G pcs 1 through 4 run what we 222 00:09:10,150 --> 00:09:06,649 call our past software basically our 223 00:09:12,550 --> 00:09:10,160 primary avionics system software and and 224 00:09:15,070 --> 00:09:12,560 they run redundant copies of that 225 00:09:17,199 --> 00:09:15,080 software so that they are all computing 226 00:09:18,940 --> 00:09:17,209 the same thing and talking to each other 227 00:09:22,000 --> 00:09:18,950 so that they can check each other out 228 00:09:24,250 --> 00:09:22,010 and make sure that all of the computers 229 00:09:25,960 --> 00:09:24,260 are functioning properly and computing 230 00:09:27,940 --> 00:09:25,970 the same result given the same inputs 231 00:09:32,110 --> 00:09:27,950 that they derive from their flight 232 00:09:35,470 --> 00:09:32,120 critical buses GPC 5 which is also up 233 00:09:37,960 --> 00:09:35,480 and running for landing performs the 234 00:09:40,150 --> 00:09:37,970 exact same functions except with a 235 00:09:41,920 --> 00:09:40,160 completely different flight software 236 00:09:43,840 --> 00:09:41,930 package that's made by a different 237 00:09:46,060 --> 00:09:43,850 vendor and so this provides us some 238 00:09:48,730 --> 00:09:46,070 redundancy and protection against any 239 00:09:51,610 --> 00:09:48,740 insidious software issues that might 240 00:09:55,650 --> 00:09:51,620 conceivably take down all four pass G 241 00:09:58,990 --> 00:09:55,660 pcs given given some some anomalies or 242 00:10:00,389 --> 00:09:59,000 singularities and computation / 0 errors 243 00:10:03,370 --> 00:10:00,399 or something something something 244 00:10:05,560 --> 00:10:03,380 insidious like that and so normally all 245 00:10:07,180 --> 00:10:05,570 five of those computers are up the way 246 00:10:11,650 --> 00:10:07,190 we configure the computers is we assign 247 00:10:13,870 --> 00:10:11,660 each computer to talk and to drive if 248 00:10:16,569 --> 00:10:13,880 you will one of the flight critical 249 00:10:20,199 --> 00:10:16,579 buses a bus is just simply a collection 250 00:10:24,370 --> 00:10:20,209 of input/output devices that link the 251 00:10:27,220 --> 00:10:24,380 computer to physical pumps valves flight 252 00:10:29,920 --> 00:10:27,230 control surfaces thrusters Jets engines 253 00:10:32,860 --> 00:10:29,930 and other things that are required to to 254 00:10:35,350 --> 00:10:32,870 fly Atlantis and so we have for flight 255 00:10:37,510 --> 00:10:35,360 criticals for flight critical strings 256 00:10:41,079 --> 00:10:37,520 for flight critical buses and we assign 257 00:10:45,100 --> 00:10:41,089 J pcs 1 through 4 to the buses 1 through 258 00:10:47,889 --> 00:10:45,110 4 respectively GPC five runs the backup 259 00:10:50,889 --> 00:10:47,899 flight software and again provides some 260 00:10:54,430 --> 00:10:50,899 redundancy as far as the software part 261 00:10:55,930 --> 00:10:54,440 of the the computer management and all 262 00:10:57,760 --> 00:10:55,940 five of those computers will be up for 263 00:11:00,050 --> 00:10:57,770 entry and 264 00:11:04,940 --> 00:11:00,060 ideally we won't have any additional 265 00:11:07,100 --> 00:11:04,950 problems or failures Philips loss with 266 00:11:09,950 --> 00:11:07,110 NASA Space Flight calm a couple 267 00:11:12,080 --> 00:11:09,960 questions first did you see any kind of 268 00:11:14,300 --> 00:11:12,090 the failure signature well not your 269 00:11:16,190 --> 00:11:14,310 shift but the orbit three shift did they 270 00:11:20,270 --> 00:11:16,200 see any kind of a signature at the time 271 00:11:22,810 --> 00:11:20,280 of failure for GPC for are you asking if 272 00:11:25,850 --> 00:11:22,820 there was some kind of telemetry or 273 00:11:28,130 --> 00:11:25,860 leading indicator before the the MDM 274 00:11:29,930 --> 00:11:28,140 fail are the GBC fail yeah or like it 275 00:11:31,850 --> 00:11:29,940 was there any errors or anything like 276 00:11:33,980 --> 00:11:31,860 that or seen at the time or to just fail 277 00:11:36,170 --> 00:11:33,990 to quit there was nothing that was seen 278 00:11:38,750 --> 00:11:36,180 in telemetry for that computer at the 279 00:11:40,820 --> 00:11:38,760 time it just failed to quit happened 280 00:11:42,710 --> 00:11:40,830 happened pretty much right out of the 281 00:11:45,980 --> 00:11:42,720 blue flight control team responded per 282 00:11:48,380 --> 00:11:45,990 procedure and and reconfigured of course 283 00:11:50,720 --> 00:11:48,390 our initial indication was the master 284 00:11:53,330 --> 00:11:50,730 alarm that we saw in telemetry that when 285 00:11:56,920 --> 00:11:53,340 the system failed in several of our 286 00:11:59,180 --> 00:11:56,930 flight controllers of course reported 287 00:12:00,860 --> 00:11:59,190 indications that they would see as a 288 00:12:05,000 --> 00:12:00,870 result of losing the systems management 289 00:12:07,220 --> 00:12:05,010 function on that GPC and then the 290 00:12:08,660 --> 00:12:07,230 frequency of this type of a failure is 291 00:12:11,660 --> 00:12:08,670 this something that has been seen before 292 00:12:13,730 --> 00:12:11,670 and if so how frequently it has a been 293 00:12:16,310 --> 00:12:13,740 seen Justin you know the recent past 294 00:12:18,940 --> 00:12:16,320 well this this type of a failure is 295 00:12:21,980 --> 00:12:18,950 actually very infrequent this is the 296 00:12:24,260 --> 00:12:21,990 really only the second bonafide 297 00:12:27,830 --> 00:12:24,270 in-flight anomaly that we have had of 298 00:12:30,740 --> 00:12:27,840 this particular design of GPC we've 299 00:12:33,110 --> 00:12:30,750 we've had two designs of GPC and the 300 00:12:35,390 --> 00:12:33,120 shuttle program you may have heard last 301 00:12:37,400 --> 00:12:35,400 time we talked about computers mr. 302 00:12:39,280 --> 00:12:37,410 Harwood I think I mentioned that we had 303 00:12:42,800 --> 00:12:39,290 a number of computer failures on sts9 304 00:12:45,740 --> 00:12:42,810 that that designer model of 305 00:12:48,680 --> 00:12:45,750 general-purpose computer was was phased 306 00:12:51,710 --> 00:12:48,690 out some years ago and so the the 307 00:12:53,390 --> 00:12:51,720 current model of GPC that's in use has 308 00:12:55,670 --> 00:12:53,400 only experienced one other anomaly like 309 00:12:57,490 --> 00:12:55,680 this and that was on sds 71 back in 310 00:13:00,050 --> 00:12:57,500 summer of nineteen ninety-five and 311 00:13:03,560 --> 00:13:00,060 interestingly enough it was also on 312 00:13:06,950 --> 00:13:03,570 Atlantis and also on GPC for now that's 313 00:13:09,440 --> 00:13:06,960 the slot that the the GPC was in when it 314 00:13:10,040 --> 00:13:09,450 failed the actual physical serial number 315 00:13:13,160 --> 00:13:10,050 you 316 00:13:14,900 --> 00:13:13,170 and hardware is not the same it's not 317 00:13:19,340 --> 00:13:14,910 physically the same computer that was on 318 00:13:20,840 --> 00:13:19,350 Atlantis back in on sds 71 but basically 319 00:13:22,460 --> 00:13:20,850 that's the only other other failure 320 00:13:29,660 --> 00:13:22,470 we've had from this series of computer 321 00:13:32,300 --> 00:13:29,670 in orbit traditional questions Robert hi 322 00:13:35,810 --> 00:13:32,310 Robert Freeman with collectspace.com on 323 00:13:37,490 --> 00:13:35,820 the stuck latch on the locker you 324 00:13:39,079 --> 00:13:37,500 mentioned maintenance can you qualify 325 00:13:41,690 --> 00:13:39,089 that a little bit is it pulling out a 326 00:13:44,990 --> 00:13:41,700 pry bar and trying to get yourself into 327 00:13:48,019 --> 00:13:45,000 that mechanically or is it unscrewing 328 00:13:51,290 --> 00:13:48,029 the the door how is that done okay great 329 00:13:53,540 --> 00:13:51,300 question the particular Locker in 330 00:13:57,620 --> 00:13:53,550 question has an access door on it 331 00:14:01,579 --> 00:13:57,630 however the entire panel on which that 332 00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:01,589 door is situated and attached is 333 00:14:06,650 --> 00:14:04,010 fastened to the floor with about 25 334 00:14:08,870 --> 00:14:06,660 captive fasteners and so essentially we 335 00:14:10,670 --> 00:14:08,880 just essentially have to go to the the 336 00:14:13,220 --> 00:14:10,680 edges of that whole panel after we 337 00:14:15,440 --> 00:14:13,230 remove the cargo and various other 338 00:14:19,490 --> 00:14:15,450 things that are stowed there from from 339 00:14:20,870 --> 00:14:19,500 the area and just unhinge a nun loosen 340 00:14:23,569 --> 00:14:20,880 those fasteners and then we can remove 341 00:14:25,280 --> 00:14:23,579 the whole panel and get to the back side 342 00:14:26,690 --> 00:14:25,290 of that door with the with the stuck 343 00:14:30,610 --> 00:14:26,700 latch and then we should be able to 344 00:14:32,750 --> 00:14:30,620 remediated fairly quickly by resetting a 345 00:14:35,690 --> 00:14:32,760 set screw which we think is probably 346 00:14:39,050 --> 00:14:35,700 come loose or maybe trying to address a 347 00:14:42,889 --> 00:14:39,060 failed spring of some kind bidding 348 00:14:44,510 --> 00:14:42,899 Denise Chow space calm with the GPC 3 349 00:14:47,449 --> 00:14:44,520 how confident are you that you won't 350 00:14:50,510 --> 00:14:47,459 have another switch teased or related 351 00:14:53,420 --> 00:14:50,520 incident during reentry ok great 352 00:14:55,939 --> 00:14:53,430 question well we're going to we're going 353 00:14:59,060 --> 00:14:55,949 to basically see where we are with that 354 00:15:01,910 --> 00:14:59,070 GPC when we we bring it up for undock 355 00:15:03,530 --> 00:15:01,920 and fly around in a few days now one of 356 00:15:05,990 --> 00:15:03,540 the things about the switch T's 357 00:15:08,210 --> 00:15:06,000 phenomenon is it's it's really a feature 358 00:15:10,860 --> 00:15:08,220 of the switch it's something that we 359 00:15:13,440 --> 00:15:10,870 cover in training and and 360 00:15:16,890 --> 00:15:13,450 you know when I went through my initial 361 00:15:19,530 --> 00:15:16,900 data processing system training a few 362 00:15:22,230 --> 00:15:19,540 years ago and I first tried to expand 363 00:15:23,730 --> 00:15:22,240 expand to set and power up g pcs I did 364 00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:23,740 the exact same thing it's something that 365 00:15:27,240 --> 00:15:25,450 that can sort of happen if you're not 366 00:15:29,190 --> 00:15:27,250 really paying attention it's it's the 367 00:15:32,190 --> 00:15:29,200 technique for avoiding switch T's is 368 00:15:34,290 --> 00:15:32,200 actually very easy to implement so we 369 00:15:37,260 --> 00:15:34,300 are pretty confident we won't have the 370 00:15:39,870 --> 00:15:37,270 have the problem again if we do however 371 00:15:42,120 --> 00:15:39,880 we do know how to bring that bring that 372 00:15:44,010 --> 00:15:42,130 computer backup will be on the lookout 373 00:15:47,550 --> 00:15:44,020 and ready to implement the procedures 374 00:15:49,590 --> 00:15:47,560 that are required to to reinitialize the 375 00:15:53,400 --> 00:15:49,600 the computer within a reasonable amount 376 00:15:56,280 --> 00:15:53,410 of time and so we should have plenty of 377 00:15:59,040 --> 00:15:56,290 time to get the computers in proper 378 00:16:04,440 --> 00:15:59,050 configuration prior to execution of the 379 00:16:07,050 --> 00:16:04,450 deorbit burn for entry ok Irene Klotz 380 00:16:09,090 --> 00:16:07,060 with Reuters um to computer glitches on 381 00:16:11,300 --> 00:16:09,100 one flight seems pretty high odds 382 00:16:20,790 --> 00:16:11,310 somehow do you know they're not related 383 00:16:23,610 --> 00:16:20,800 well the for the GPC three case when 384 00:16:25,290 --> 00:16:23,620 that MDM or excuse me I MDM is what we 385 00:16:28,560 --> 00:16:25,300 call him on the space station sign when 386 00:16:30,630 --> 00:16:28,570 that computer failed it failed at the 387 00:16:33,720 --> 00:16:30,640 moment the crew was actuated the switch 388 00:16:36,390 --> 00:16:33,730 we got feedback from the crew about 389 00:16:39,300 --> 00:16:36,400 about what had happened the signature 390 00:16:41,130 --> 00:16:39,310 was consistent with the ops notes that 391 00:16:44,579 --> 00:16:41,140 we have consistent with the switch tease 392 00:16:47,150 --> 00:16:44,589 in this case the crew was asleep nobody 393 00:16:50,880 --> 00:16:47,160 was anywhere near the switches and so 394 00:16:54,090 --> 00:16:50,890 this this signature and the circumstance 395 00:16:56,970 --> 00:16:54,100 was different now to be sure as I said 396 00:17:00,120 --> 00:16:56,980 earlier until we complete our analysis 397 00:17:02,910 --> 00:17:00,130 of the dump data we have no idea exactly 398 00:17:05,520 --> 00:17:02,920 what caused the the failure of GPC for 399 00:17:07,439 --> 00:17:05,530 the fact that GPC for was able to be 400 00:17:10,740 --> 00:17:07,449 reinitialized is very telling because 401 00:17:13,949 --> 00:17:10,750 what it says is that whatever the issue 402 00:17:15,689 --> 00:17:13,959 was it's either software or a transient 403 00:17:18,210 --> 00:17:15,699 hardware issue and of course transient 404 00:17:20,220 --> 00:17:18,220 hardware issues tend to fall in fairly 405 00:17:22,590 --> 00:17:20,230 limited subset of things that you that 406 00:17:23,730 --> 00:17:22,600 you'd look for things like radiation or 407 00:17:25,559 --> 00:17:23,740 some kind of 408 00:17:27,960 --> 00:17:25,569 chuckle anomaly that we can that we 409 00:17:29,750 --> 00:17:27,970 could go investigate so we've got 410 00:17:33,810 --> 00:17:29,760 different circumstances different 411 00:17:36,690 --> 00:17:33,820 signatures the fail condition on GPC 3 412 00:17:39,290 --> 00:17:36,700 wuzz wuzz wuzz wuzz different GPC 3 413 00:17:41,820 --> 00:17:39,300 actually failed to halt whereas this 414 00:17:44,970 --> 00:17:41,830 computer failed to quit which is two 415 00:17:49,680 --> 00:17:44,980 different computational and and physical 416 00:17:51,210 --> 00:17:49,690 states of the hardware so until you 417 00:17:53,190 --> 00:17:51,220 complete your analysis you can't really 418 00:17:54,870 --> 00:17:53,200 say anything for sure but we've got many 419 00:17:56,790 --> 00:17:54,880 reasons to believe that that these two 420 00:17:59,220 --> 00:17:56,800 failures are not caused by the same 421 00:18:03,240 --> 00:17:59,230 thing now the fact that we did have two 422 00:18:05,040 --> 00:18:03,250 computer failures on the same flight on 423 00:18:07,830 --> 00:18:05,050 a spacecraft that's otherwise performing 424 00:18:10,590 --> 00:18:07,840 beautifully that's not at all lost on me 425 00:18:12,840 --> 00:18:10,600 I do have a saying that you're not 426 00:18:15,480 --> 00:18:12,850 paranoid if if they really are after you 427 00:18:18,090 --> 00:18:15,490 so I am cautiously optimistic that we'll 428 00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:18,100 have a healthy data processing system 429 00:18:23,580 --> 00:18:20,410 for undocking for the rest of the 430 00:18:26,669 --> 00:18:23,590 mission and for re-entry but we will be 431 00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:26,679 watching closely any other questions 432 00:18:32,910 --> 00:18:30,250 here in Houston good John 13 here in 433 00:18:35,010 --> 00:18:32,920 town the during the the crew briefing we 434 00:18:36,930 --> 00:18:35,020 heard that one of the station members 435 00:18:38,460 --> 00:18:36,940 say this thing started look smaller can 436 00:18:40,980 --> 00:18:38,470 you explain where they're putting all 437 00:18:43,040 --> 00:18:40,990 this stuff and it you know why would the 438 00:18:46,410 --> 00:18:43,050 station seem smaller in his estimation 439 00:18:48,450 --> 00:18:46,420 okay that's an excellent question the 440 00:18:52,980 --> 00:18:48,460 station is is starting to seem smaller 441 00:18:55,890 --> 00:18:52,990 because we have brought up in the npl m 442 00:18:58,410 --> 00:18:55,900 and in the mid-deck an incredible amount 443 00:19:02,820 --> 00:18:58,420 of stuff of course that's a technical 444 00:19:05,460 --> 00:19:02,830 term there's just so much cargo and in 445 00:19:07,110 --> 00:19:05,470 so many large bags that that have been 446 00:19:10,260 --> 00:19:07,120 brought up now is there being unloaded 447 00:19:12,930 --> 00:19:10,270 from the MPL em they are being stowed in 448 00:19:14,280 --> 00:19:12,940 the livable spaces on board the 449 00:19:17,280 --> 00:19:14,290 International Space Station they're 450 00:19:19,799 --> 00:19:17,290 being stowed in the lab module in node 1 451 00:19:22,049 --> 00:19:19,809 no 2 in the gym wherever we can 452 00:19:24,360 --> 00:19:22,059 reasonably put them in the the pmm the 453 00:19:26,400 --> 00:19:24,370 pressurized multi-purpose module and so 454 00:19:29,100 --> 00:19:26,410 as all these cargoes being deployed in 455 00:19:31,380 --> 00:19:29,110 addition to the supplies the provisions 456 00:19:32,930 --> 00:19:31,390 and and spare parts and other cargo that 457 00:19:35,220 --> 00:19:32,940 was already on the on the space station 458 00:19:37,080 --> 00:19:35,230 there are certain portions of the space 459 00:19:38,550 --> 00:19:37,090 station certain modules certain 460 00:19:41,520 --> 00:19:38,560 habitable volumes which which quite 461 00:19:45,090 --> 00:19:41,530 honestly get cramped that is that is a 462 00:19:48,480 --> 00:19:45,100 price that we are paying for bringing up 463 00:19:51,270 --> 00:19:48,490 these supplies but as the orbiter leaves 464 00:19:55,050 --> 00:19:51,280 and the crew resident on the space 465 00:19:59,070 --> 00:19:55,060 station is able to leverage and manage 466 00:20:01,260 --> 00:19:59,080 that cargo to be placed more efficiently 467 00:20:04,980 --> 00:20:01,270 and to be placed according to their 468 00:20:09,510 --> 00:20:04,990 priority of need for ongoing undocked 469 00:20:11,340 --> 00:20:09,520 operations things will level out more as 470 00:20:13,530 --> 00:20:11,350 the visiting vehicles that are coming up 471 00:20:16,770 --> 00:20:13,540 over the next several months come up and 472 00:20:18,870 --> 00:20:16,780 we dispose of foam in those visiting 473 00:20:20,310 --> 00:20:18,880 vehicles as trash that's going to help a 474 00:20:22,440 --> 00:20:20,320 lot one of the things you have to 475 00:20:24,420 --> 00:20:22,450 understand is that with the cargo that 476 00:20:27,990 --> 00:20:24,430 we've brought up in order to make sure 477 00:20:30,990 --> 00:20:28,000 that it survives intact it's riot on on 478 00:20:33,330 --> 00:20:31,000 the space shuttle it's packed in a great 479 00:20:36,420 --> 00:20:33,340 deal of foam in fact much of the volume 480 00:20:38,190 --> 00:20:36,430 that is taken up by this cargo is it's 481 00:20:40,890 --> 00:20:38,200 packing foam designed to protect it and 482 00:20:42,390 --> 00:20:40,900 so once it's on orbit and once the foam 483 00:20:45,090 --> 00:20:42,400 is no longer needed that really 484 00:20:47,610 --> 00:20:45,100 represents a bit of a nuisance more than 485 00:20:49,560 --> 00:20:47,620 anything and so will try to pack as much 486 00:20:52,980 --> 00:20:49,570 of that phone as possible in the MPL m4 487 00:20:55,620 --> 00:20:52,990 return so hopefully the the spacecraft 488 00:20:56,850 --> 00:20:55,630 will seem a bit less cramped in a few 489 00:20:58,980 --> 00:20:56,860 days when we get ready to close out the 490 00:21:01,980 --> 00:20:58,990 MPL m and of course there's just a 491 00:21:03,870 --> 00:21:01,990 natural an actual situation where 492 00:21:05,640 --> 00:21:03,880 there's other pieces of foam and other 493 00:21:08,130 --> 00:21:05,650 packing material that we just won't be 494 00:21:10,050 --> 00:21:08,140 able to dispose of until much later say 495 00:21:12,750 --> 00:21:10,060 on a progress vehicle or or one of the 496 00:21:15,360 --> 00:21:12,760 other visiting vehicles that come okay 497 00:21:18,830 --> 00:21:15,370 anybody else here at JSC will take 498 00:21:21,450 --> 00:21:18,840 questions now from Kennedy Space in it 499 00:21:25,500 --> 00:21:21,460 hi Marcia Dunn Associated Press with a 500 00:21:27,510 --> 00:21:25,510 couple questions for GPC three you 501 00:21:29,640 --> 00:21:27,520 described it as Phil to halt i believe i 502 00:21:31,170 --> 00:21:29,650 don't i'm not quite sure exactly what 503 00:21:33,420 --> 00:21:31,180 that means what is that also an 504 00:21:35,640 --> 00:21:33,430 immediate shutdown and how many times 505 00:21:40,170 --> 00:21:35,650 have you seen that type of occurrence on 506 00:21:42,030 --> 00:21:40,180 orbit before ok in in the in the event 507 00:21:43,680 --> 00:21:42,040 of a failed to halt basically what 508 00:21:48,150 --> 00:21:43,690 that's saying is you know we have a mode 509 00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:48,160 switch that tells the GPC if we if we 510 00:21:53,310 --> 00:21:49,810 switch it to that position tell us that 511 00:21:57,000 --> 00:21:53,320 PC to halt which essentially means to to 512 00:21:58,890 --> 00:21:57,010 stop computing it doesn't flush it or 513 00:22:02,160 --> 00:21:58,900 purge it of its if its software doesn't 514 00:22:04,620 --> 00:22:02,170 register necessarily any errors in the 515 00:22:06,390 --> 00:22:04,630 box itself but it just stops I like to 516 00:22:08,850 --> 00:22:06,400 think of it in layman's terms is 517 00:22:11,880 --> 00:22:08,860 analogous to win you simply close the 518 00:22:14,310 --> 00:22:11,890 lid on your laptop your laptop is still 519 00:22:16,620 --> 00:22:14,320 is really asleep the operating system is 520 00:22:19,470 --> 00:22:16,630 still active in some small part of the 521 00:22:21,810 --> 00:22:19,480 the computer's memory if you open the 522 00:22:23,460 --> 00:22:21,820 lid on your laptop you'll essentially be 523 00:22:25,170 --> 00:22:23,470 able to resume your session exactly 524 00:22:27,180 --> 00:22:25,180 where you left off that's the way you 525 00:22:29,460 --> 00:22:27,190 should think about the halt state in the 526 00:22:32,190 --> 00:22:29,470 case of failed to quit the application 527 00:22:34,080 --> 00:22:32,200 software that's in the the computer as 528 00:22:37,470 --> 00:22:34,090 well as the operating system it just 529 00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:37,480 stopped computation stopped all of the 530 00:22:43,440 --> 00:22:40,090 processes just simply stopped in an 531 00:22:46,380 --> 00:22:43,450 otherwise unrecoverable manner and of 532 00:22:49,320 --> 00:22:46,390 course we buy a necessity did have to do 533 00:22:52,050 --> 00:22:49,330 a data dump and we initialize we 534 00:22:55,110 --> 00:22:52,060 initialize that computer now as I 535 00:22:57,240 --> 00:22:55,120 indicated before the the only other 536 00:22:59,040 --> 00:22:57,250 instance of a spontaneous on-orbit 537 00:23:02,810 --> 00:22:59,050 anomaly that we've seen like what we had 538 00:23:06,120 --> 00:23:02,820 on GPC for was on sds 71 as far as the 539 00:23:07,530 --> 00:23:06,130 the the issue we had with GPC three the 540 00:23:09,180 --> 00:23:07,540 sort of the switch T's phenomenon I 541 00:23:10,740 --> 00:23:09,190 don't have exact numbers but i know we 542 00:23:12,570 --> 00:23:10,750 have we've seen that in orbit a few 543 00:23:14,310 --> 00:23:12,580 times as i said it's a feature of the 544 00:23:16,200 --> 00:23:14,320 switch and and if you don't finesse it 545 00:23:20,430 --> 00:23:16,210 quite the right way you're prone to get 546 00:23:23,430 --> 00:23:20,440 that situation thank you and i'm 547 00:23:26,490 --> 00:23:23,440 wondering what happens if one of the 548 00:23:28,350 --> 00:23:26,500 other three gb see also experienced some 549 00:23:31,350 --> 00:23:28,360 sort of quit to halt quit to quit to 550 00:23:33,060 --> 00:23:31,360 quit what happens then and is there 551 00:23:35,520 --> 00:23:33,070 anything that you could think of that 552 00:23:38,100 --> 00:23:35,530 might come back from this analysis that 553 00:23:42,270 --> 00:23:38,110 would prompt you to consider an early 554 00:23:45,300 --> 00:23:42,280 return well according to our flight 555 00:23:48,690 --> 00:23:45,310 rules we would have mission duration 556 00:23:51,870 --> 00:23:48,700 impacts if I if I lost more than if I 557 00:23:54,090 --> 00:23:51,880 lost two computers essentially then we 558 00:23:56,910 --> 00:23:54,100 would attenuate the mission into what we 559 00:23:59,910 --> 00:23:56,920 call an MDF for minimum duration flight 560 00:24:02,610 --> 00:23:59,920 if I lost three computers then according 561 00:24:03,950 --> 00:24:02,620 to my rules I would be looking at 562 00:24:05,970 --> 00:24:03,960 coming home essentially at my next 563 00:24:08,370 --> 00:24:05,980 primary landing site which would be 564 00:24:10,500 --> 00:24:08,380 essentially within within the day so as 565 00:24:14,070 --> 00:24:10,510 long as I have a computer that I have 566 00:24:16,950 --> 00:24:14,080 demonstrated I can load and bring up 567 00:24:18,480 --> 00:24:16,960 into our redundant set and into our 568 00:24:21,540 --> 00:24:18,490 common set if you will and that's the 569 00:24:22,740 --> 00:24:21,550 the collective of redundant computers if 570 00:24:24,930 --> 00:24:22,750 you will as long as I've demonstrated 571 00:24:26,730 --> 00:24:24,940 that I can do that I don't have any 572 00:24:30,270 --> 00:24:26,740 acute mission duration impacts now 573 00:24:32,490 --> 00:24:30,280 having said that if we were to 574 00:24:35,640 --> 00:24:32,500 experience another problem with a 575 00:24:37,710 --> 00:24:35,650 different computer honestly I think we 576 00:24:40,020 --> 00:24:37,720 would all be thinking very very hard 577 00:24:42,419 --> 00:24:40,030 about what was going on we do what we 578 00:24:44,250 --> 00:24:42,429 always do which is we would would get 579 00:24:45,720 --> 00:24:44,260 the data first the very first steps of 580 00:24:47,850 --> 00:24:45,730 our troubleshooting procedures are to do 581 00:24:49,770 --> 00:24:47,860 data dumps we've you data dumps of the 582 00:24:51,360 --> 00:24:49,780 computer that was functional and 583 00:24:54,060 --> 00:24:51,370 monitoring the other computers in the 584 00:24:55,950 --> 00:24:54,070 set to see what it saw we do data dumps 585 00:24:58,590 --> 00:24:55,960 of the failed computer to see what it 586 00:25:01,200 --> 00:24:58,600 thinks it saw about itself and we get 587 00:25:03,419 --> 00:25:01,210 the engineers to analyze that and and 588 00:25:06,030 --> 00:25:03,429 take a good hard look at it beyond that 589 00:25:08,520 --> 00:25:06,040 we draw some some some reasonable 590 00:25:10,110 --> 00:25:08,530 conclusions about what would happen so 591 00:25:12,990 --> 00:25:10,120 that's about as much as I could I could 592 00:25:16,049 --> 00:25:13,000 tell you about about our response to 593 00:25:18,630 --> 00:25:16,059 another issue again just to emphasize 594 00:25:21,240 --> 00:25:18,640 even with the problem we had on GPC 3 595 00:25:23,910 --> 00:25:21,250 which was due to a condition that we 596 00:25:26,610 --> 00:25:23,920 have an explanation for and the problem 597 00:25:28,560 --> 00:25:26,620 that we've had on GPC for which we don't 598 00:25:31,410 --> 00:25:28,570 yet have an explanation for what I can 599 00:25:33,090 --> 00:25:31,420 tell you is that we have demonstrated 600 00:25:35,910 --> 00:25:33,100 the ability to bring both of those 601 00:25:39,000 --> 00:25:35,920 computers up to full computational 602 00:25:41,000 --> 00:25:39,010 readiness and add them to our redundant 603 00:25:44,820 --> 00:25:41,010 set and so that's a meaningful 604 00:25:46,380 --> 00:25:44,830 capability that we have I believe that 605 00:25:48,560 --> 00:25:46,390 was our last question from Kennedy Space 606 00:25:52,680 --> 00:25:48,570 Center will go down to the phone bridge 607 00:25:54,690 --> 00:25:52,690 we'll start with Bill Harwood hey thanks 608 00:25:55,950 --> 00:25:54,700 alesya I just want to follow Marshalls 609 00:25:58,530 --> 00:25:55,960 question I have two quick ones along 610 00:26:00,360 --> 00:25:58,540 those lines some of flight rules 611 00:26:03,270 --> 00:26:00,370 perspective if you have a computer to 612 00:26:04,770 --> 00:26:03,280 steam the victim of a transient I know 613 00:26:06,780 --> 00:26:04,780 that's address specifically in there 614 00:26:10,049 --> 00:26:06,790 what did it take to make you fully trust 615 00:26:12,690 --> 00:26:10,059 it again okay that's an excellent 616 00:26:15,450 --> 00:26:12,700 question a computer that is that is 617 00:26:16,250 --> 00:26:15,460 deemed to be the victim of a transient 618 00:26:19,000 --> 00:26:16,260 hardware fail 619 00:26:21,730 --> 00:26:19,010 and how we get to that determination is 620 00:26:24,110 --> 00:26:21,740 after analyzing all of this dump data 621 00:26:26,480 --> 00:26:24,120 after analyzing the memory of the 622 00:26:28,760 --> 00:26:26,490 computers in the absence of any other 623 00:26:31,070 --> 00:26:28,770 credible explanation like a switch 624 00:26:35,380 --> 00:26:31,080 switch tease or some other some other 625 00:26:38,390 --> 00:26:35,390 issue if we don't see any software 626 00:26:40,940 --> 00:26:38,400 problem or indication of a computational 627 00:26:42,680 --> 00:26:40,950 error what that tells us in the 628 00:26:45,290 --> 00:26:42,690 conclusion that we draw from that is 629 00:26:47,660 --> 00:26:45,300 that there's some transient 630 00:26:50,870 --> 00:26:47,670 hardware-based condition that resulted 631 00:26:53,780 --> 00:26:50,880 in the the GP sees temporary loss of 632 00:26:57,620 --> 00:26:53,790 function in that instance we have 633 00:27:00,500 --> 00:26:57,630 specific guidance as to which buses we 634 00:27:03,770 --> 00:27:00,510 will allow that GPC to drive so in the 635 00:27:05,900 --> 00:27:03,780 instance of GPC for if it is determined 636 00:27:09,440 --> 00:27:05,910 that this was a transient hardware 637 00:27:13,310 --> 00:27:09,450 failure my rules tell me that however I 638 00:27:17,060 --> 00:27:13,320 configure it I can only assign it to to 639 00:27:19,790 --> 00:27:17,070 drive what we call string 4 and that is 640 00:27:21,590 --> 00:27:19,800 chosen because of the the types of 641 00:27:24,620 --> 00:27:21,600 hardware that are connected to that 642 00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:24,630 particular data bus the hardware that's 643 00:27:30,830 --> 00:27:28,170 connected to data buses 1 2 & 3 are 644 00:27:32,180 --> 00:27:30,840 deemed of such a critical nature that we 645 00:27:34,760 --> 00:27:32,190 don't want to subject them to the 646 00:27:36,920 --> 00:27:34,770 possibility of another transient 647 00:27:38,750 --> 00:27:36,930 hardware fault that might impact our 648 00:27:40,910 --> 00:27:38,760 ability to control the spacecraft during 649 00:27:44,180 --> 00:27:40,920 critical operations like undocking 650 00:27:48,380 --> 00:27:44,190 fly-around and certainly for re-entry so 651 00:27:52,820 --> 00:27:48,390 even the good news is that because this 652 00:27:55,970 --> 00:27:52,830 is GPC for and our nominal configuration 653 00:27:58,970 --> 00:27:55,980 for entry is such that we assign GPC 42 654 00:28:00,470 --> 00:27:58,980 string for even if it's if it's deemed 655 00:28:02,990 --> 00:28:00,480 the victim of a transient hardware 656 00:28:05,840 --> 00:28:03,000 failure unless we see something more 657 00:28:08,450 --> 00:28:05,850 insidious that gives us pause we can 658 00:28:10,940 --> 00:28:08,460 basically assign this GPC to its nominal 659 00:28:13,760 --> 00:28:10,950 string to its nominal data bus that we 660 00:28:15,650 --> 00:28:13,770 would normally do for entry because if 661 00:28:18,200 --> 00:28:15,660 it does experience a problem during 662 00:28:20,750 --> 00:28:18,210 entry the particular failure mode in 663 00:28:23,300 --> 00:28:20,760 this instance with that data config will 664 00:28:24,890 --> 00:28:23,310 not cause any immediate problems for 665 00:28:29,010 --> 00:28:24,900 controllability the spacecraft during 666 00:28:31,470 --> 00:28:29,020 reentry thanks got that and to 667 00:28:32,820 --> 00:28:31,480 two more real quick ones from the flight 668 00:28:34,650 --> 00:28:32,830 real perspective and where you stand 669 00:28:36,750 --> 00:28:34,660 today none of these computers are failed 670 00:28:38,550 --> 00:28:36,760 at this point you have all five at this 671 00:28:39,960 --> 00:28:38,560 point although there are some leans 672 00:28:41,760 --> 00:28:39,970 against four until you finish your 673 00:28:44,910 --> 00:28:41,770 analysis that right that's absolutely 674 00:28:46,350 --> 00:28:44,920 correct okay thank you know reporters 675 00:28:47,910 --> 00:28:46,360 whenever things like this happen we all 676 00:28:49,230 --> 00:28:47,920 focus on this and think about it real 677 00:28:51,390 --> 00:28:49,240 hard because we don't understand it to 678 00:28:53,250 --> 00:28:51,400 the degree you do do you consider this a 679 00:28:56,730 --> 00:28:53,260 major issue a minor issue or something 680 00:29:00,800 --> 00:28:56,740 in between well I tell you I consider 681 00:29:04,290 --> 00:29:00,810 every issue a major issue until I 682 00:29:06,870 --> 00:29:04,300 believe we fully understand it and have 683 00:29:10,440 --> 00:29:06,880 no reason to think otherwise so right 684 00:29:12,900 --> 00:29:10,450 now the again we've analyzed only part 685 00:29:15,870 --> 00:29:12,910 of the dump data bill and and we haven't 686 00:29:17,370 --> 00:29:15,880 seen any any obvious software problems 687 00:29:19,380 --> 00:29:17,380 honestly that's the thing I tend to 688 00:29:21,780 --> 00:29:19,390 worry about the most you know there's 689 00:29:23,880 --> 00:29:21,790 some error in the flight software that 690 00:29:26,670 --> 00:29:23,890 we haven't cotton because of the exact 691 00:29:29,160 --> 00:29:26,680 time of day that when the time of the 692 00:29:32,370 --> 00:29:29,170 year and the particular value from the 693 00:29:33,840 --> 00:29:32,380 master clock when when figured into all 694 00:29:35,760 --> 00:29:33,850 of the other computations basically 695 00:29:38,070 --> 00:29:35,770 makes the thing fail that that sort of 696 00:29:39,990 --> 00:29:38,080 thing I that's the scenario that tends 697 00:29:42,420 --> 00:29:40,000 to keep me up at night so once we 698 00:29:45,110 --> 00:29:42,430 complete the dump complete our analysis 699 00:29:47,130 --> 00:29:45,120 excuse me of the dump data and 700 00:29:49,490 --> 00:29:47,140 determined that we don't see any 701 00:29:52,950 --> 00:29:49,500 indications of that type of scenario 702 00:29:56,460 --> 00:29:52,960 then I will I will be a bit more 703 00:29:58,590 --> 00:29:56,470 comfortable but I never I never let 704 00:30:01,020 --> 00:29:58,600 myself get get too comfortable until 705 00:30:03,900 --> 00:30:01,030 we've got all of our friends with their 706 00:30:05,220 --> 00:30:03,910 boots on the ground okay well thanks let 707 00:30:07,710 --> 00:30:05,230 me just squeeze in one last quick window 708 00:30:08,880 --> 00:30:07,720 at this point barring something unusual 709 00:30:10,440 --> 00:30:08,890 like you say with the software or 710 00:30:11,760 --> 00:30:10,450 whatever you would expect to have all 711 00:30:14,370 --> 00:30:11,770 five of these guys up and running for 712 00:30:17,550 --> 00:30:14,380 entry at this point that's my 713 00:30:20,610 --> 00:30:17,560 expectation but again that's pending the 714 00:30:23,490 --> 00:30:20,620 results of the remaining analysis of the 715 00:30:26,490 --> 00:30:23,500 dump data okay thanks a lot okay thank 716 00:30:28,110 --> 00:30:26,500 you Bill mother James Dean thank you 717 00:30:31,280 --> 00:30:28,120 very much James Dean with florida today 718 00:30:34,170 --> 00:30:31,290 and it gets just one more on the G pcs 719 00:30:36,810 --> 00:30:34,180 let's start with them so I understand 720 00:30:40,560 --> 00:30:36,820 expectations you have all five but 721 00:30:41,730 --> 00:30:40,570 setting aside more critical issues I 722 00:30:42,630 --> 00:30:41,740 guess where you'd have to cut short 723 00:30:46,020 --> 00:30:42,640 mission duration 724 00:30:48,810 --> 00:30:46,030 if you didn't have all five again I'm 725 00:30:52,140 --> 00:30:48,820 just trying to understand how that would 726 00:30:55,620 --> 00:30:52,150 impact your the Warriors ability to you 727 00:30:57,090 --> 00:30:55,630 know execute its its undock and reentry 728 00:31:00,090 --> 00:30:57,100 and all that stuff and you you really 729 00:31:02,400 --> 00:31:00,100 actually only need a few it's one 730 00:31:04,380 --> 00:31:02,410 computer to get through it all or you 731 00:31:05,970 --> 00:31:04,390 know what is the impact of not having 732 00:31:09,900 --> 00:31:05,980 five step or turn out to be the case 733 00:31:14,400 --> 00:31:09,910 okay let me try to address your question 734 00:31:16,500 --> 00:31:14,410 without without without boring basically 735 00:31:18,480 --> 00:31:16,510 the the benefit we have from the 736 00:31:20,730 --> 00:31:18,490 multiple computers during the critical 737 00:31:24,750 --> 00:31:20,740 phase is that we can have more than one 738 00:31:28,230 --> 00:31:24,760 computer assigned to to drive a 739 00:31:29,880 --> 00:31:28,240 particular data bus or a particular set 740 00:31:32,730 --> 00:31:29,890 of equipment on the spacecraft that we 741 00:31:35,480 --> 00:31:32,740 need to control thrusters to steer the 742 00:31:37,740 --> 00:31:35,490 spacecraft and to get critical 743 00:31:40,650 --> 00:31:37,750 navigational data from its sensors and 744 00:31:43,800 --> 00:31:40,660 so by having multiple computers we are 745 00:31:47,400 --> 00:31:43,810 able to selectively assign each physical 746 00:31:50,130 --> 00:31:47,410 machine to drive a particular data bus 747 00:31:52,110 --> 00:31:50,140 while again in the redundant set those 748 00:31:53,520 --> 00:31:52,120 computers talk to each other so that 749 00:31:55,500 --> 00:31:53,530 they can monitor each other's 750 00:31:57,240 --> 00:31:55,510 performance and exchange data and 751 00:31:59,850 --> 00:31:57,250 fundamentally compute the same things 752 00:32:02,750 --> 00:31:59,860 and so what that does for us is it 753 00:32:06,600 --> 00:32:02,760 prevents the failure of any one computer 754 00:32:08,670 --> 00:32:06,610 from taking away functionality that 755 00:32:10,860 --> 00:32:08,680 might cause a dangerous loss of control 756 00:32:14,010 --> 00:32:10,870 of the spacecraft so I just set that up 757 00:32:15,990 --> 00:32:14,020 because that's fundamentally the driver 758 00:32:19,950 --> 00:32:16,000 that really drives how we manage these 759 00:32:21,870 --> 00:32:19,960 so if we do have a problem with another 760 00:32:24,240 --> 00:32:21,880 computer or we see something such 761 00:32:26,310 --> 00:32:24,250 something with GPC for for instance in 762 00:32:28,830 --> 00:32:26,320 our analysis such that we we will not 763 00:32:30,150 --> 00:32:28,840 have it up for entry again we don't 764 00:32:32,490 --> 00:32:30,160 think that's what we get to but if we do 765 00:32:35,070 --> 00:32:32,500 get there what that simply means is that 766 00:32:38,220 --> 00:32:35,080 the data bus that would normally be 767 00:32:40,740 --> 00:32:38,230 driven directly by GPC for will simply 768 00:32:43,200 --> 00:32:40,750 be assigned to another computer and that 769 00:32:46,020 --> 00:32:43,210 other computer which would normally only 770 00:32:49,290 --> 00:32:46,030 have one bus assigned to it for entry 771 00:32:52,320 --> 00:32:49,300 would have to and the way we would pick 772 00:32:56,400 --> 00:32:52,330 which computer would share the two buses 773 00:33:00,960 --> 00:32:56,410 is based on what provides us the best 774 00:33:03,780 --> 00:33:00,970 just failure tolerance against a loss of 775 00:33:06,030 --> 00:33:03,790 control or degraded control for that 776 00:33:11,280 --> 00:33:06,040 situation so hopefully that makes some 777 00:33:15,600 --> 00:33:11,290 sense thank you and wondering if you 778 00:33:18,450 --> 00:33:15,610 mentioned the the transfer completion 779 00:33:21,390 --> 00:33:18,460 percentage and wondering if this these 780 00:33:24,900 --> 00:33:21,400 uh you know glitches and other special 781 00:33:26,460 --> 00:33:24,910 events we're seeing today i have i guess 782 00:33:29,280 --> 00:33:26,470 the crew already had some off-duty time 783 00:33:31,320 --> 00:33:29,290 built in but would you still say they're 784 00:33:33,660 --> 00:33:31,330 ahead of schedule or will be by the end 785 00:33:37,110 --> 00:33:33,670 of the day or has this load of down a 786 00:33:40,230 --> 00:33:37,120 little bit more and maybe put am just on 787 00:33:42,960 --> 00:33:40,240 schedule and and this could follow up to 788 00:33:46,320 --> 00:33:42,970 that since you said that i think the 789 00:33:48,810 --> 00:33:46,330 goal is to get raffaello filled up to 790 00:33:52,950 --> 00:33:48,820 about ninety percent any possibility 791 00:33:54,600 --> 00:33:52,960 have an estimate of the actual pounds of 792 00:33:58,200 --> 00:33:54,610 cargo that are that that amounts to 793 00:34:00,360 --> 00:33:58,210 being loaded back into Rafaella okay to 794 00:34:02,820 --> 00:34:00,370 address the the first question these 795 00:34:05,340 --> 00:34:02,830 problems these these little glitches if 796 00:34:07,920 --> 00:34:05,350 you will have indeed slowed the crew 797 00:34:11,040 --> 00:34:07,930 down now the good news is because they 798 00:34:13,080 --> 00:34:11,050 were running ahead of the timeline not 799 00:34:15,720 --> 00:34:13,090 tremendously head with with the transfer 800 00:34:17,490 --> 00:34:15,730 because the transfer is really really 801 00:34:19,950 --> 00:34:17,500 the the meat of the mission and it's 802 00:34:21,150 --> 00:34:19,960 it's just it's a it's a really messy 803 00:34:23,490 --> 00:34:21,160 operation until you get everything 804 00:34:25,140 --> 00:34:23,500 organized but but sandy and the rest of 805 00:34:27,750 --> 00:34:25,150 the crew were running a far enough ahead 806 00:34:30,630 --> 00:34:27,760 that once we were able to once we took 807 00:34:32,730 --> 00:34:30,640 some time to troubleshoot the computers 808 00:34:34,500 --> 00:34:32,740 to give the crew at extra 30 minutes of 809 00:34:36,300 --> 00:34:34,510 sleep time this morning to make up for 810 00:34:39,240 --> 00:34:36,310 the sleep time that was lost all of 811 00:34:40,740 --> 00:34:39,250 those little things we are right on plan 812 00:34:43,680 --> 00:34:40,750 at this point we're right on the 813 00:34:45,060 --> 00:34:43,690 timeline so the little margin we had we 814 00:34:46,320 --> 00:34:45,070 gave some up for computer 815 00:34:49,590 --> 00:34:46,330 troubleshooting and now we're right on 816 00:34:52,320 --> 00:34:49,600 plan as far as an estimate of the the 817 00:34:54,780 --> 00:34:52,330 amount of mass honestly right now i 818 00:34:56,370 --> 00:34:54,790 can't really give you a great estimate 819 00:34:59,640 --> 00:34:56,380 we're at a we're at a phase of the 820 00:35:01,800 --> 00:34:59,650 choreography of transfer to where I 821 00:35:04,080 --> 00:35:01,810 really won't know what the mass 822 00:35:06,930 --> 00:35:04,090 properties of rafaela looked like 823 00:35:09,810 --> 00:35:06,940 until we complete the evening transfer 824 00:35:12,450 --> 00:35:09,820 brief tonight and have incorporated all 825 00:35:15,900 --> 00:35:12,460 of the updates we get from from from 826 00:35:18,840 --> 00:35:15,910 Sandy into our transfer plan for 827 00:35:24,180 --> 00:35:18,850 tomorrow I think probably this time 828 00:35:25,560 --> 00:35:24,190 tomorrow Chris Edelen or the the other 829 00:35:27,780 --> 00:35:25,570 flight directors on the station side 830 00:35:31,410 --> 00:35:27,790 will probably have a better idea of how 831 00:35:34,890 --> 00:35:31,420 much mass is in the MPN I could ask just 832 00:35:39,810 --> 00:35:34,900 one more question on transfer is that 833 00:35:41,790 --> 00:35:39,820 the essentially what most what you've 834 00:35:44,940 --> 00:35:41,800 gotten out of the extra day that's been 835 00:35:47,640 --> 00:35:44,950 added is just increasing that percentage 836 00:35:49,560 --> 00:35:47,650 that you're loading back into raffaello 837 00:35:51,630 --> 00:35:49,570 is that essentially what what's been 838 00:35:53,480 --> 00:35:51,640 gained aside from any other sort of 839 00:35:56,040 --> 00:35:53,490 organization stuff on the station 840 00:35:58,200 --> 00:35:56,050 increasing the percentage of cargo that 841 00:35:59,700 --> 00:35:58,210 we load into the MPL m that's a big 842 00:36:02,340 --> 00:35:59,710 piece of what's been gained with the 843 00:36:04,140 --> 00:36:02,350 extra day we think we are on a 844 00:36:06,480 --> 00:36:04,150 trajectory to where we will be able to 845 00:36:10,170 --> 00:36:06,490 fill the MPL em up to virtually a 846 00:36:11,790 --> 00:36:10,180 hundred percent volumetrically and so 847 00:36:13,350 --> 00:36:11,800 that's a big piece of what's been gained 848 00:36:15,480 --> 00:36:13,360 the other the other part of what's been 849 00:36:19,710 --> 00:36:15,490 gained is that we have additional time 850 00:36:22,080 --> 00:36:19,720 to to do some some science that we 851 00:36:25,380 --> 00:36:22,090 weren't otherwise planning to be able to 852 00:36:28,350 --> 00:36:25,390 do and to get the the samples many of 853 00:36:31,170 --> 00:36:28,360 them are biological from that science 854 00:36:32,790 --> 00:36:31,180 back home on the orbiter on a much 855 00:36:37,530 --> 00:36:32,800 accelerated timeframe than we were 856 00:36:39,270 --> 00:36:37,540 otherwise expecting to thank you James 857 00:36:43,140 --> 00:36:39,280 do we have anyone else on the phone 858 00:36:45,690 --> 00:36:43,150 bridge please yes Charles Agatha yes go 859 00:36:47,790 --> 00:36:45,700 ahead yeah throw back in examiner com 860 00:36:49,560 --> 00:36:47,800 space on shares calm turning over to the 861 00:36:50,880 --> 00:36:49,570 weather I was wondering if you could 862 00:36:54,210 --> 00:36:50,890 comment if you've been in talks with 863 00:36:56,940 --> 00:36:54,220 jaksa on the pending typhoon mahon that 864 00:37:00,360 --> 00:36:56,950 approaching southern Japan possibly 865 00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:00,370 tuesday night okay unfortunately I don't 866 00:37:06,600 --> 00:37:02,650 have any information on that at this 867 00:37:08,170 --> 00:37:06,610 time but we'll be sure to to get some 868 00:37:10,390 --> 00:37:08,180 information in 869 00:37:12,549 --> 00:37:10,400 and provide some some feedback for you 870 00:37:15,849 --> 00:37:12,559 on the mission status briefing tomorrow 871 00:37:18,700 --> 00:37:15,859 or the following day okay thank you so 872 00:37:22,630 --> 00:37:18,710 much okay do we have any follow-ups here 873 00:37:25,960 --> 00:37:22,640 at houston mark I'm sorry thanks again 874 00:37:29,230 --> 00:37:25,970 mark Grove for aviation week if if you 875 00:37:31,089 --> 00:37:29,240 look at what happened with GP c4 and it 876 00:37:33,849 --> 00:37:31,099 looks like it had something to do with 877 00:37:37,480 --> 00:37:33,859 with flying through the South Atlantic 878 00:37:40,900 --> 00:37:37,490 anomaly and radiation where does that 879 00:37:44,349 --> 00:37:40,910 leave you with GPC for in terms of 880 00:37:47,339 --> 00:37:44,359 future hops can you use it for re-entry 881 00:37:50,559 --> 00:37:47,349 and undocking and all of that does it 882 00:37:52,450 --> 00:37:50,569 leave you with a with a hardware 883 00:37:56,920 --> 00:37:52,460 question that kind of puts you back on a 884 00:37:59,859 --> 00:37:56,930 quandary okay if it turns out that that 885 00:38:03,579 --> 00:37:59,869 we have no other credible explanation or 886 00:38:06,910 --> 00:38:03,589 smoking gun if you will and and just to 887 00:38:10,390 --> 00:38:06,920 be clear after we analyze the dump data 888 00:38:12,069 --> 00:38:10,400 if we don't see any obvious problems or 889 00:38:16,200 --> 00:38:12,079 any indications of software or 890 00:38:19,059 --> 00:38:16,210 computational errors you know the the 891 00:38:21,370 --> 00:38:19,069 global category of what's left which is 892 00:38:24,160 --> 00:38:21,380 the transient hardware failure could be 893 00:38:26,650 --> 00:38:24,170 anything radiation being one of many 894 00:38:30,789 --> 00:38:26,660 possible causes of a transient hardware 895 00:38:35,559 --> 00:38:30,799 failure in that case we would treat the 896 00:38:38,859 --> 00:38:35,569 GPC as suspect if you will just to use 897 00:38:41,380 --> 00:38:38,869 layman's terms and as I described the 898 00:38:43,150 --> 00:38:41,390 flight rules earlier there are certain 899 00:38:45,760 --> 00:38:43,160 flight critical buses we simply would 900 00:38:48,640 --> 00:38:45,770 not assign that computer to control 901 00:38:50,349 --> 00:38:48,650 during critical operations like the 902 00:38:53,799 --> 00:38:50,359 undocking fly-around and so what what I 903 00:38:56,200 --> 00:38:53,809 would do as as my team will be executing 904 00:38:57,910 --> 00:38:56,210 the undocking fly-around is we would 905 00:39:00,339 --> 00:38:57,920 assign the The Associated flight 906 00:39:02,020 --> 00:39:00,349 critical buses to the other computers 907 00:39:04,930 --> 00:39:02,030 that we had available to us now since 908 00:39:07,030 --> 00:39:04,940 GPC 5 has our backup flight software and 909 00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:07,040 we normally keep that azz sleepy to 910 00:39:12,640 --> 00:39:09,290 serve as our BFS or backup flight 911 00:39:16,329 --> 00:39:12,650 software machine I would continue to 912 00:39:18,730 --> 00:39:16,339 leverage GPC to notionally to do our 913 00:39:20,660 --> 00:39:18,740 systems management functions and rely on 914 00:39:22,880 --> 00:39:20,670 g pcs one and three 915 00:39:25,880 --> 00:39:22,890 for the GNC function during the 916 00:39:27,260 --> 00:39:25,890 undocking fly-around now for entry again 917 00:39:30,470 --> 00:39:27,270 because of how we normally do the 918 00:39:33,650 --> 00:39:30,480 stringing in which data bus I'm allowed 919 00:39:35,210 --> 00:39:33,660 to put GPC for on I would actually have 920 00:39:38,059 --> 00:39:35,220 something that very much looks like a 921 00:39:41,210 --> 00:39:38,069 nominal string for entry so between 922 00:39:44,120 --> 00:39:41,220 undocking and entry we would probably 923 00:39:46,059 --> 00:39:44,130 have GPC for remain asleep except for 924 00:39:51,859 --> 00:39:46,069 periods where we might want to get some 925 00:39:53,450 --> 00:39:51,869 just some innocuous runtime on the GPC 926 00:39:56,390 --> 00:39:53,460 just to watch it compute without it 927 00:39:57,799 --> 00:39:56,400 driving any flight critical buses but it 928 00:40:00,670 --> 00:39:57,809 probably stay asleep until it was time 929 00:40:03,620 --> 00:40:00,680 to bring it up and string it for entry 930 00:40:05,299 --> 00:40:03,630 Irene Klotz with Reuters and just to 931 00:40:07,880 --> 00:40:05,309 make sure I understand the bottom line 932 00:40:10,460 --> 00:40:07,890 along this is that if GPC for is 933 00:40:13,819 --> 00:40:10,470 transient it is not considered failed 934 00:40:16,730 --> 00:40:13,829 for the flight rule that would that 935 00:40:18,859 --> 00:40:16,740 would become come into play without to 936 00:40:21,710 --> 00:40:18,869 out and then this other question is 937 00:40:23,329 --> 00:40:21,720 really silly but at this point on with 938 00:40:25,789 --> 00:40:23,339 the way that computers are right now has 939 00:40:29,180 --> 00:40:25,799 there been any changes at all to how you 940 00:40:31,430 --> 00:40:29,190 want the crew to be packing stuff up for 941 00:40:34,520 --> 00:40:31,440 the return home or unpacking things 942 00:40:39,230 --> 00:40:34,530 there been any kind of mission logistics 943 00:40:41,900 --> 00:40:39,240 album impacts just you know five failure 944 00:40:44,089 --> 00:40:41,910 modes down the way if you did end up 945 00:40:45,950 --> 00:40:44,099 having to leave early thanks okay that's 946 00:40:48,859 --> 00:40:45,960 an excellent question and the easy 947 00:40:50,839 --> 00:40:48,869 answer is we have not changed any aspect 948 00:40:53,839 --> 00:40:50,849 of how we've been executing the mission 949 00:40:55,520 --> 00:40:53,849 as a result of the the GPC failures is 950 00:40:57,440 --> 00:40:55,530 you know from a strategic perspective or 951 00:41:00,200 --> 00:40:57,450 from a tactical perspective with respect 952 00:41:02,000 --> 00:41:00,210 to the transfer we are executing on plan 953 00:41:05,329 --> 00:41:02,010 the only adjustment we've made is 954 00:41:07,730 --> 00:41:05,339 because we took about 30 minutes of the 955 00:41:10,039 --> 00:41:07,740 crew sleep time last night to to move 956 00:41:13,460 --> 00:41:10,049 this the systems management machine to 957 00:41:17,059 --> 00:41:13,470 GPC to we gave them an additional 30 958 00:41:18,710 --> 00:41:17,069 minutes to sleep and adjusted our plan 959 00:41:21,079 --> 00:41:18,720 to make everything fit in the box 960 00:41:22,700 --> 00:41:21,089 properly other than that there's nothing 961 00:41:24,140 --> 00:41:22,710 that we've done differently and nothing 962 00:41:26,780 --> 00:41:24,150 that we anticipate doing differently 963 00:41:29,720 --> 00:41:26,790 unless again we see something that's 964 00:41:32,610 --> 00:41:29,730 that's more sinister and so far we 965 00:41:35,190 --> 00:41:32,620 haven't seen any evidence of that 966 00:41:36,750 --> 00:41:35,200 any others here in Houston seeing none a 967 00:41:39,170 --> 00:41:36,760 couple of NASA television programming 968 00:41:42,780 --> 00:41:39,180 notes at eleven twenty nine Central Time 969 00:41:45,150 --> 00:41:42,790 1229 Eastern President Barack Obama is 970 00:41:48,990 --> 00:41:45,160 scheduled call station crew members and 971 00:41:51,270 --> 00:41:49,000 at one thirty p.m. central time to 30 972 00:41:53,670 --> 00:41:51,280 p.m. eastern will have a replay of the 973 00:41:55,560 --> 00:41:53,680 crew news conference traditional 974 00:41:57,840 --> 00:41:55,570 reminder you can follow activities of 975 00:42:01,890 --> 00:41:57,850 the International Space Station and the